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NOTES 
THE PATHOLOGY OF INSIDER TRADING AND 
JAPAN'S .AMENDED SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
LAW* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans are investing abroad in increasing numbers, 1 lured 
by the low cost of foreign investment2 and the opportunity to elim-
inate the systematic risk inherent in domestic investment.3 But in-
vestors have encountered new risks, which include the global mar-
ket's dependance on the strength of large institutional investors.• 
One failure in a global financial market may now effect other mar-
kets, including those in the United States:~ Events which affected 
* I thank Mr. and Mrs. Tony Shaw for their diligent translation of Japanese law. While 
their assistance was invaluable, they are not responsible for any errors or shortcomings in 
this Note. Any error or shortcoming is a product only of my own judgment. 
1. See Comment, Exporting United States Law: Transnational Securities Fraud and 
Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 373, 373 n.1 
(1988); see also Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987 CoLUM. 
Bus. L. REV. 303, 305 (explaining many of the causes). American investment in foreign coun-
tries totalled $347.2 billion in 1976, $949 billion in 1985, and $1.068 trillion in 1986. See 
Comment, supra, at 373 n.1. The bulk of foreign investment consists of private assets in 
foreign securities. See id. (quoting Sloane, The Lure of Investing Abroad, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
11, 1987, at Dl, col. 2). 
2. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 305. The lower cost of foreign investment is a result of 
improved telecommunications technology, deregulation of securities industries, worldwide 
growth in the availability and demand for capital, and the consequential explosion in the 
number of institutional intermediaries offering worldwide services and internationally diver-
sified investment funds. See id. at 304-05. The Japanese markets were opened in part by the 
abolition of the "dual-audit principle," which had required that the financial statements of 
companies seeking capital in Japan be certified by a Japanese accountant. See Perlmutter, 
Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 
89, 92 (1987) (Practising Law Institute B4-6802). Japanese markets were also opened by the 
simplification of the annual reports that each issuer must file with the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance. Id. 
3. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 305; Phalon, The Gaijin Are Back, FORBES, Dec. 26, 
1988, at 37; see also Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical 
Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 163-65 (1982). 
4. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 307-8. An excellent example of how the policies of for-
eign governments may have a profound impact on domestic markets is provided by the 
losses that domestic banks have suffered as a result of loans to foreign banks and industries. 
See id. 
5. See Meyer, Martin, Hoshiai & McKillop, The "Crash of '88" Scenario, NEWSWEEK, 
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only foreign markets are now capable of having a profound and 
immediate impact on any number of other markets. 
Japan has one of the largest capital markets to actively seek a 
larger role in the internatfonal trade of securities.6 In 1987 the To-
kyo Stock Exchange passed the New York Stock Exchange to be-
come the world's largest stock exchange in terms of the market 
value of all listed shares. 7 The Osaka Stock Exchange, which is 
one-sixth the size of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has since passed 
the London Exchange to become the world's third largest.8 Foreign 
investment in securities listed on these exchanges has also in-
creased.9 Foreign listings on the Tokyo Stock Exchange have in-
creased from eleven in 1984 to fifty-eight in 1987, 10 and foreign 
membership in the Tokyo Exchange has also expanded due in part 
to pressure from the United States.11 Foreign investors have never-
theless largely eschewed the Japanese markets in spite of their size 
and influence, believing them grossly overvalued and dangerously 
Nov. 23, 1987, at 49. 
6. See, e.g., Umemuri, Looking to Tokyo for Finance, EuROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 2 
(Special Supplement). 
7. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 89. 
8. See id. 
9. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 160. In 1980 American transactions in Japanese stock 
involved an exchange of nearly $2. 7 billion, exceeded only by transactions in Canadian stock 
of $6.7 billion and British stock of $2.7 billion. See id. These transactions comprised fifteen 
percent of all foreign transactions involving American investors. See id. In 1986 Japanese 
investors bought and sold American stock valued at nearly $27 billion. See TREASURY BULL., 
Dec. 1987, at 84. Total Japanese investment in the capital stock of American companies was 
exceeded only by British investment of $64 billion, Swiss investment of $37 billion and Ca-
nadian investment of roughly $35 billion. See id. Roughly 10% of all foreign transactions in 
American stock involved Japanese investors. See id. 
10. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 91. Thirty-five of the foreign corporations 
whose stock is traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange are based in the United States. See id. 
Although no foreign corporation is presently listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange, plans are 
being made that would open the exchange to foreign listings. See id. 
11. See Graven & Swalen, Tokyo Stock Exchange Opens Its Doors to Six U.S., 10 
Other Foreign Firms, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Rubinfien, Tokyo Exchange's 
New Foreign Members Begin Trading, but With Little Fanfare, Wall St. J., May 23, 1988, 
at 30, col. 1. The nine American firms with membership in the exchange include: Merrill 
Lynch & Co.; Goldman Sachs & Co.; and Morgan Stanley & Co. (all admitted in 1986); and 
Salomon Brothers Inc., Prudential-Bache Securities Inc.; Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc.; 
Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.; and First Boston Corp. (all 
admitted in 1987). See Graven & Swalen, supra, at 5, col. 1. Salomon Brothers and Morgan 
Stanley are also members of the Osaka Stock Exchange, but are limited . to trade in futures. 
Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 90. 
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speculative.12 This overvaluation is in part the result of the perva-
sive manipulation and insider trading in Japanese stocks.18 
Japan's stock markets have been a source of inexorable scan-
dal and conflict. The most recent scandal centered on the sale of 
Recruit-Cosmos14 stock prior to a listed public offering. The shares 
were allegedly sold to seventy-six individuals, tG including aides to 
former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita16 and other high ranking 
officials of Japanese government, and executives in leading Japa-
nese brokerage17 and communications companies.18 The buyers 
12. See Rudinitsky, Sloan & Fuhrman, Land of the Rising Stocks, FORBES, May 18, 
1987, at 139-40 (analogizing the Tokyo market to the Dutch tulip craze and the South Sea 
bubble); Shapiro, Japan Puts Insider Rules into Effect, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1988, at Fl, 
col. 6. 
13. See Abelson, Up and Down Wall Street, BARRON'S, Jan. 4, 1988 at 1, 41; Rudinit-
sky, Sloan & Fuhrman, supra note 12, at 140. Mr. Abelson believes that the imposition of 
any regulation to control market manipulation would suffocate the speculation responsible 
for the overvaluation of Japanese securities and trigger a collapse in stock prices. Abelson, 
supra, at 41. 
14. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, Japanese Aides Tied to Scandal on Stock Sales, Wall 
St. J., July 7, 1988, at 18, col. 1. Recruit Cosmos Co. is the real estate subsidiary of Recruit 
Co., one of Japan's highest-flying service companies. The company was founded by 
Hiromasa Ezoe, who resigned along with one of the media executives who allegedly pur-
chased the prelisted shares. See id. Mr. Ezoe founded the company in the early 1960's and, 
through charismatic leadership, created a conglomerate of 27 subsidiaries with consolidated 
sales of ¥ 424 billion. See Yoder & Kanabayashi, Highfiying Japanese Service Company 
Threatened by Stock Purchase Scandal, Asian Wall St. J., July 18, 1988, at 11, col. 1. The 
company's sales are roughly equal to those of the Yamaha Motor Company. See id. 
15. See Kanabayashi & Mark, Tokyo Determines Recruit Share Sale Broke Trading 
Law, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1988, at 24, col. 2. 
16. See Stock Scandals May Encourage Japan to Speed Passage of Insider Trading 
Law, Asian Wall St. J., Aug 11, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Implicated in the scandal were several 
aides to former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, for-
mer Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and other senior politicians in the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party. See id. Such favors are not uncommon in Japan, where politicians rely 
heavily on the support of large corporations. See Chira, Japan 'Money Politics' Rears Its 
Head, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1988, at A3, col. 1 (quoting Gerald L. Curtis, professor of Politi-
cal Science at Columbia University). 
17. See Rubinfien, Japan's Scandal on Stock Sales Widens to Banks, Wall St. J., Jul. 
19, 1988, at 25, col. 1. Among those implicated as having purchased the prelisted shares is an 
executive of the Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., who admitted to purchasing 1,000 shares 
with ¥ 12 million borrowed from another Recruit subsidiary. See id. Diawa Securities, one 
of the underwriters of the Recruit Cosmos offering, denied that any its executives were in-
volved, but agreed to cooperate with investigating officials. See id. Nomura Securities, 
Y amaichi Securities, and Nikko Securities are also cooperating in the investigation. See In-
ternational Corporate Report, Wall St. J., Jul. 25, 1988, at 13, col. 1. 
18. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, Japan's Stock Scandal Taints Politicians and Execu-
tives, Asian Wall St. J., July 11, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Ko Morita, the president and chief 
executive officer of the major financial daily Nihon Keizai Shimbum resigned in early July, 
19S8, citing "health and other reasons including trading" in Recruit Cosmos stock. Id. The 
chairman of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Japan's largest company, was also impli-
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subsequently sold the shares at huge profits after the public offer-
ing.19 Industry officials speculate that the prelisted stock was sold 
in exchange for political favors. 20 After an investigation, the Minis-
try of Finance announced that the sale had broken no law, 21 but 
later ruled that Recruit had violated law only to the extent that it 
failed to notify the Ministry of an advance sale to more than fifty 
parties.22 The scandal prompted the significant revisions to the in-
sider trading laws that are the subject of this Note, and eventually 
forced the resignation of Mr. Takeshita, three cabinet ministers, 
one member of the Diet,23 and a leader of the opposition Socialist 
party.24 
Another major controversy involved the announcement of a 
¥ 20 billion extraordinary loss by Tateho Chemical Industries26 on 
September 2, 1987. 26 Prior to the announcement, Nikko Securities, 
Tateho's underwriter, sold 1.4 million shares on the Osaka Stock 
cated in the scandal. See Hiatt & Shapiro, New Justice Minister in Japan Quits Post, 
Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1988, at A21, col. 5. 
19. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 18, col. 1. The shares were allegedly 
sold at prices exceeding four times the price originally paid. See id. 
20. See Yoder & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 11, col. 1. New companies may find it 
very difficult to break into Japanese business and political networks built on long term rela-
tionships. See id.; see also Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: Challenge to the Integration 
of the Japanese Equity Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REV. 419, 421. Recruit's success was largely a result of its ability to capitalize on markets 
overlooked by traditional businesses, and its success in novel markets made it even more 
difficult for the company to break into the corporate network. See Yoder & Kanabayashi, 
supra note 14, at 11, col. 1. 
21. See Lehner & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 18, col. 1. 
22. See Kanabayashi & Mark, supra note 15, at 24, col. 2. Recruit argued that the sale 
did involve 76 buyers, but that the stock was actually distributed in two separate sales with 
subscriptions of 39 and 37 parties each. See id. The Ministry determined that the arrange-
ment, which involved a total of 125,600 shares at ¥ 1,200 each, actually constituted one sale. 
See id. 
23. See Hiatt & Shapiro, supra note 18, at A21. The resignations include those of Jus-
tice Minister Takashi Hasegawa on December 30, 1988, see id.; Finance Minister l\iichi 
Miyazawa in December 1988, Milestones, TIME, Dec. 19, 1988, at 66; and Opposition Leader 
Takumi Ueda on November 4, 1988, Hiatt, Japan's Stock Scandal Bags First Victim, 
Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1988, at Al4, col. l; and former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in 
April of 1989, see Hiatt & Shapiro, Japanese Politics Shaken-Scandal, Resignation May 
Change the Rules, Wash. Post., Apr. 26, 1989, at 1, col 1. 
24. See Chira, Tokyo Opposition Leader Quits in Stock Scandal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 
1989, at A3, col. 1. 
25. See Schoenburger, Tateho Inquiry Shows Japan's Struggle to Define and Combat 
Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 38, col. 1. Tateho is a medium-sized manu-
facturer of insulating materials. See id. 
26. See id. Tateho's losses were allegedly the result of unauthorized speculation in se-
curities by company executives. See id. 
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Exchange in a series of transactions. 27 Officials stopped all trading 
in Tateho stock after the share price had fallen ¥ 300, the maxi-
mum daily decline allowed by exchange rules. 28 Industry experts 
speculated that company executives and securities analysts sold 
the stock with the benefit of Nikko's access to inside information 
about the company's finances. 29 
The failure of insider trading regulation in Japan is the prod-
uct of social acceptance, traditional business structure, and the po-
litical self-interest. These factors explain why recent amendments 
to Japan's securities laws, adopted as a response to public outrage 
over government involvement in the Recruit-Cosmos scandal, are 
not a significant improvement. Part II will explain the limitations 
on the United States' ability to police foreign markets. Part III will 
compare insider trading regulation in the United States with the 
insider trading regulation that existed in Japan prior to the imple-
mentation of the new law in 1989. Part IV will explore the three 
primary causes for the failure of insider trading and market ma-
nipulation regulation in Japan. Part V will examine the recent 
changes in Japanese regulation. This Note will conclude that new 
legislation adopted by the Japanese Diet is unlikely to provide any 
significant improvement, but that some change is necessary to pro-
tect other participant markets from the speculative excesses in the 
Japanese markets. 
II. JAPAN'S DUTY TO POLICE ITS MARKETS 
International agreements notwithstanding, limitations im-
posed by international law make it impossible for any single coun-
try to police the world's markets. Consequently, as the Japanese 
role in international markets increases, so must its responsibility to 
protect them from the fraud and abuse that threaten global finan-
cial security.3° Countries are unable to control those activities in 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See Graven, Tokyo Moves Timidly on Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Aug 18, 1988, at 
8, col. 1. "It's a case where a big securities company had to know a little manufacturer was 
speculating on securities. And they knew how bad their finances were and then they went 
and sold off shares. But then Japanese don't really know what insider trading is." Id. (quot-
ing Masakazu Kobayashi, author and critic of Japan's securities industry). 
30. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. But see Interview with Professor San-
dra N. Hurd, Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Syracuse University School of 
Management, in Syracuse, New York (March 4, 1989) [hereinafter Hurd Interview]. Profes-
sor Hurd argues that the market integrity theory, which holds that insider trading impairs 
the long term efficiency of the market, may be misguided. See id. See also T. MANNE, IN-
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the foreign markets that affect them indirectly, and must rely on 
the domestic law of other nations for protection. Those countries 
whose domestic markets play the largest role in the international 
capital market must protect their own markets to ensure the sta-
bility of the global market. 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In spite of the expansionist efforts of American courts, the 
protection of American markets from the effects of insider trading 
and price manipulation in foreign countries remains limited by 
fundamental principles of subject matter jurisdiction. 31 The first is 
the principle of territoriality, which provides every state with "the 
right freely to organize and develop its social and economic system . 
• • • "
32 Absent an agreement to the contrary, a state is free to act 
within its own jurisdictional boundaries in response to events oc-
curring outside them, but no state can exercise its power within 
the jurisdiction of another state.38 Although the territoriality prin-
ciple has imbued many nations with extensive discretion in the ex-
traterritorial application of their laws, 34 it has suffered a predict-
able lack of recognition among the countries against which it is 
exercised. 36 
The principle of nationality is another recognized basis of ju-
risdiction for the extraterritorial application of domestic law.36 The 
principle is embodied in the doctrine of active nationality, which 
permits jurisdiction over all nationals,87 and passive nationality, 
which allows jurisdiction over foreign nationals who injure a for-
eign or domestic national. 88 
SIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1969) (legalized insider trading might promote effi-
ciency as a form of executive compensation). Given the lack of consensus, the United States 
is unjustified in its effort to compel other countries to conform with its stance against in-
sider trading. See Hurd Interview, supra. 
31. See Comment, supra note 1, at 375-76. 
32. European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade 
with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 891, 893 (1982); see Comment, supra note 31 at 
375-76. 
33. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7, 1927); 
Comment, supra note 31, at 375-76. 
34. See Comment, supra note 1, at 378. 
35. See id. at 376. 
36. See id. at 377. 
37. See id. at 377 & n.16. 
38. See id. at 377. The passive nationality principle is widely criticized as a basis for 
jurisdiction. See id. at 377 n.17. The failure of many nations to recognize the passive nation-
ality principle is one reason much of the responsibility for policing international markets 
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Before holding United States securities law applicable to 
frauds committed in a foreign country, American courts must first 
decide that Congress intended the law to be so applied. 89 While 
they are powerless to invalidate an act of Congress because it con-
flicts with general principles of international law, the courts rarely 
find Congressional intent to be inconsistent with international 
law;'0 Although Congress did not explicitly provide for the extra-
territorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
courts have applied the Act in a manner consistent with the doc-
trines of conduct and effect41 in light of its general purpose42 and 
construction. 48 
The United States has expanded the traditional principle of 
territoriality through the application of two common jurisdictional 
doctrines.44 The conduct doctrine permits the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals as a result of conduct occurring within 
the territory of the United States.46 The effect doctrine permits 
United States courts to attach reasonable legal consequences to 
conduct occurring outside of the geographic jurisdiction of the 
United States that has a substantial impact on persons or property 
located in United States territory.46 
depends upon those nations whose domestic markets comprise the largest part of the inter-
national market. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
39. See Comment, supra note 1, at 380. 
40. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1948) (holding the Fair 
Labor Standards Act applicable to contracts performed on property leased from Great Brit-
ain). "It is a matter of statutory interpretation as to whether or not statutes are effective 
beyond the limits of national sovereignty." Id. See also Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 
(D.C. Cir. 1959) (upholding the 1943 confiscation of property owned by a German national 
in violation of a treaty with Germany). 
41. See Comment, supra note 1, at 384. 
42. See id. The Act was intended "to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, 
the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system 
and the Federal Reserve system and to ensure the maintenance of fair and honest mar-
kets." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
43. See Comment, supra note 1, at 384. Portions of the Act expressly preclude extrater-
ritorial application. The provisions of Chapter 78d, for example, were not to "apply to any 
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United 
States .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1982). Congress' failure to provide similar exemptions for 
section lO(b) indicates an intent that it be applied extraterritorially. See Comment, supra 
note 1, at 384. 
44. See Comment, supra note 1, at 379. 
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
402(1)(a) & comment c (1986). 
46. Id. §§ 402(1)(c) & comment d, 403(2). United States courts have limited this expan-
sion of the territoriality principle to cases in which the effect is "substantial, direct, and 
forseeable," id. § 403(2)(a), and the rule is not otherwise inconsistent with principles of law 
of a jurisdiction with a greater interest in the conduct or its effect, id. § 403(3) & comment 
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The conduct and effect doctrines provide little protection from 
the inascribable consequences of extraterritorial securities fraud 
and its effect on market stability. Many events capable of having a 
profound effect on United States markets have been beyond the 
control of United States law:" Because it is limited to cases involv-
ing particularized harm to American investors, the effect doctrine 
expands federal jurisdiction to include only international securities 
fraud involving securities listed on a domestic exchange48 or which 
produces a discernable injury to American investors.49 The conduct 
doctrine permits the extraterritorial application of United States 
securities law only when the fraud was successful as a direct result 
of substantial misrepresentations made in the United States, but 
does not require that the fraud have injured American nationals or 
that the securities involved have been listed on an American ex-
change. ~0 Although it may extend the application of United States 
e. In insider trading cases, the courts have extended the protection of United States law to 
fraud involving securities listed on United States exchanges, but have refused to extend 
jurisdiction to cases involving securities not listed in the United States even if they are 
heavily subscribed by American investors or their performance is closely tied to that of 
domestic securities. See Comment, supra note 1. 
47. Such effects include, but are not limited to, the withdrawal of foreign capital, see, 
e.g., UT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); the demise of international financial orga-
nizations with extensive international relationships, see, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 
Inc., ·519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); and other events that would destabilize the international 
securities markets. 
48. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977) (a foreign plaintiff 
was permitted to sustain an action under Rule lOb-5 involving shares listed on an American 
exchange even though none of the fraudulent activity occurred in United States territory); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 
403(1), 416 (1986). 
49. See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 909; Fidenas AG v. Compagnie tnternationale Pour 
L'Informatique CU Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974; 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (similar action brought by an Ameri-
can national); see also UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1975) (the court 
found that American ownership of one-half of one percent of a company defrauded by for-
eign defendants was too insignificant to justify extraterritorial application of lOb-5); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1986). 
50. See Comment, supra note 1, at 380. The Second Circuit has been less reluctant to 
apply United States law in cases involving a United States plaintiff even when the fraud was 
not the direct result of substantial misrepresentations made in the United States. Compare 
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974 (foreign plaintiff) with Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Max-
well, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (American plaintiff). Other courts have made no distinc-
tion between foreign and American plaintiffs and have found any domestic activity that 
significantly furthers a fraud to be basis for the extraterritorial application of United States 
securities law. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977). But see Zoelsch v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (criticizing Kasser and Continental 
Grain and requiring that both foreign and domestic plaintiffs demonstrate that the alleged 
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law to a few instances of conduct having an inascribable impact on 
the United States markets, the conduct doctrine does not provide 
any control over those transactions that do not involve substantial 
representations in the United States, but that may have a tremen-
dous impact on the stability of United States markets. 
B. Evidential Problems 
Even when permitted by the doctrines of territoriality and na-
tionality, the application of United States law is often occluded by 
foreign laws designed to prevent the public disclosure of private 
financial information. in These laws permit foreign and domestic 
nationals to fraudulently buy or sell American securities through 
foreign intermediaries and avoid conviction under United States 
securities laws by foreclosing judicial access to critical evidence.62 
Specific agreements notwithstanding, American courts are power-
less to compel the cooperation of the Japanese government in ef-
forts to investigate illegal trading activity by foreigners in Ameri-
can markets. 
1. Bilateral Agreements 
While multilateral agreements designed to create diplomatic 
exceptions to secrecy laws would best enhance each nation's ability 
to obtain the information necessary to police its markets, enforce-
ment has been limited to bilateral agreements and unilateral en-
forcement.53 The most effective means of acquiring information 
has been through bilateral agreements, most often in the form of 
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") between the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and similar 
agencies of foreign governments.54 Most MOU facilitate the ex-
change of information necessary for the prosecution of insider 
trading by establishing detailed procedures for processing requests 
conduct in the United States was the direct cause of harm to the plaintiffs). 
51. See Begin, A Proposed Blueprint for Achieving Cooperation in Policing Trans-
border Securities Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 68 (1986). These include blocking statutes as 
well as bank secrecy laws. The statutes impose penalties on institutions and individuals that 
disclose the information, but fail to protect them from the penalties imposed by United 
States courts as the result of their failure to provide the requested information. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 94-95. 
54. See id. at 69; Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Sup-
port of the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988, [1987-1988 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 84,240 (June 3, 1988) [hereinafter Memoran-
dum in Support]. 
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for information55 and providing for unilateral enforcement56 should 
either party to the agreement fail to process certain requests. 57 
MOU are less abrasive on foreign sovereignty than strict uni-
lateral enforcement, 58 but are not without some disadvantages, in-
cluding the drain of protracted negotiations on the Commission's 
limited enforcement resources59 and the inconsistencies among 
agreements. 60 These inconsistencies weaken imbricated agreements 
by allowing insiders to avoid United States law by trading through 
an intermediary in a country whose laws are more permissive of 
insider trading and whose agreement with the United States re-
stricts the SEC's access to the information needed to prosecute for 
violations of United States law.61 MOU are also limited to the ex-
tent that foreign governments are willing to waive their secrecy 
laws. 62 To mollify foreign governments and secure more relaxed in-
formational barriers, Congress recently considered legislation that 
would have expanded the SEC's authority to protect the confiden-
tiality of foreign evidence, investigate alleged violations of foreign 
law in United States territory, penalize securities professionals 
55. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Se-
curities Market, 9 U. PA. J . INT'L Bus. L., 375, 435 (1987); Memorandum in Support, supra 
note 54. 
56. See infra notes at 78-81 and accompanying text. 
5.7. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 435. 
58. See id. at 435; Memorandum in Support, supra note 54. 
59. See Begin, supra note 51, at 75. 
60. See id. at 76. 
61. See id. 
62. See Comment, supra note 1, at 680. The SEC's ability to prosecute insider trading 
involving securities purchased with funds from Swiss banks was once limited by Swiss se-
crecy statutes and a 1977 treaty providing for the assistance of Swiss process only where the 
suspected activity involves a possible violation of Swiss Law. See Treaty on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 
T.A.l.S. No. 8302. Since insider trading was not a violation of Swiss law, see Memorandum 
of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International En-
forcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 
1 (1983) [hereinafter Swiss MOU] , the Swiss MOU was necessary only because insider trad-
ing fell outside the criminality requirement of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance. See, e.g., 22 
l.L.M. 785-98; see also SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Santa Fe Stock and Stock 
Options, Exchange Act Release No. 21,186 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
ii 83,648 (July 30, 1984). The agreement was appreciably strengthened only as the result of a 
private agreement between the SEC and the Swiss Banker's Association in which the bank-
ers agreed to comply with requests for information regarding mergers and acquisitions that 
met certain requirements, including evaluation by an independent Swiss board of inquiry. 
See Agreement XVI, reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 7 (1983). When the Swiss prohibited insider 
trading, the Treaty became applicable and the MOU expired. See Problems with the SEC's 
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws in Cases Involving Suspicious Trades Originating 
From Abroad, HR REP. No. 1065, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 22-3 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP. 
No. 1065] . 
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based on the findings of foreign authorities, and provide foreign 
authorities with access to SEC records.63 Of the four proposals ini-
tially contemplated, the only one adopted expanded the SEC's au-
thority to assist foreign governments in the investigation of viola-
tions of foreign securities law.64 
The United States-Japan Memorandum on the Sharing of ln-
formation,65 prompted by the mutual expectation that the "inter-
action of American and Japanese markets will continue to grow,"66 
is a vague agreement between the SEC and Japan's Ministry of 
Finance to "facilitate each agency's respective requests for surveil-
lance and investigatory information on a case-by-case basis."67 The 
agreement provides each agency with a contact in the other coun-
try, 68 but unlike the former Swiss MOU69 or the British MOU,70 
provides no procedure for the handling of requests for information. 
It is also limited by the Japanese government's "low priority for 
pursuing insider trading violations in [its] own exchanges."71 In re-
63. See H.R. REP. No. 4945, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Memorandum in Support, 
supra note 54. 
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982), as amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 § 6(b), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
(102 Stat.) 4677, 4681-82. 
On request from a foreign securities authority, the Commission may provide 
assistance in accordance with this paragraph if the requesting authority states that 
the requesting authority is conducting an investigation which it deems necessary to 
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any 
laws or rules relating to security matters that the requesting authority administers 
or enforces. The Commission may, in its discretion, conduct such investigation as 
the Commission deems necessary to collect information and evidence pertinent to 
the request for assistance. Such assistance may be provided without regard to 
whether the facts stated in the request would also constitute a violation of the laws 
of the United States. In deciding whether to provide such assistance, the Commis-
sion shall consider whether (A) the requesting authority has agreed to provide re-
ciprocal assistance in securities matters to the Commission; and (B) compliance 
with the requ~st would prejudice the public interest of the United States. 
Id. at 4681-82; See HR. No. 910, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 28-31, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 6065-68. 
65. Memorandum on the Sharing of Information, May 23, 1986, United States-Japan, 
reprinted in 25 l.L.M. 1429 [hereinafter Japanese MOU]. 
66. Id. This prediction has proven very accurate. See Ruder, Japanese Agree to Facili-
tate Greater Cooperation Among Exchanges, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, 
at 292 (Feb. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Cooperation]. 
67. Japanese MOU, supra note 65, at 1429-30. 
68. Id. at 1429-30. 
69. See Swiss MOU, supra note 62, at 1. 
70. See Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information in Matters Relat-
ing to Securities and Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, United Kingdom-United States, reprinted in 
25 I.L.M. 1431. 
71. H.R. REP. No. 1065, supra note 62, at 23-4 (1988) (citing the testimony of Sandra N. 
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sponse to these weaknesses, 72 the SEC has pressured the Japanese 
government for stronger insider trading laws73 and has met regu-
larly with officials from the Ministry of Finance. 74 Although these 
meetings facilitated the control of the interactions between the two 
markets,71~ the SEC's ability to protect domestic markets against 
insider trading through Japanese intermediaries is not significantly 
enhanced by the Japanese MOU because of the significant weak-
nesses of Japan's insider trading regulations.76 
2. Unilateral Enforcement 
The SEC has often extracted information for prosecution 
through the unilateral enforcement of United States securities 
laws. Courts may impose contempt sanctions on foreign institu-
tions and individuals that refuse to surrender financial records77 
after balancing the injury to interests of the United States caused 
by the refusal and the injury to the interests of the foreign state 
caused by the disclosure based on the the importance of the infor-
mation to be disclosed, the specificity of the request, the origin of 
the information, and the existence of alternate means to secure the 
information.78 Efforts to compel disclosure are time consuming and 
expensive, and, although "viewed by foreign countries as infringing 
on their sovereignty, ... achieve[] little in a long term solution to 
international enforcement problems."'9 Recent efforts to expand 
the unilateral jurisdiction of courts failed largely because they are 
too great a burden on foreign sovereignty and too likely to deter 
Hurd, Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy at Syracuse University) . 
72. See Hurd Interview, supra note 30. The vague language of the MOU allows the 
Japanese government to be flexible in how it chooses to respond to SEC requests, but gives 
it the opportunity to refuse a request outright. See id. 
73. Sanger, Insider Trading, the Japanese Way, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1988, at Dl, col. 
1. 
74. See, e.g., SEC, Japanese Officials Meet, Reaffirm "Cooperative Relationship", 
[Jan.-June] 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 128 (Jan. 20, 1989). 
75. See id. The two agencies recently agreed to promote greater cooperation between 
Japanese and American self-regulatory organizations, see Cooperation, supra note 66, at 
292, and created a task force "to ensure the coordination of market oversight and enforce-
ment of both United States and Japanese securities laws .. . . " Id. 
76. See H.R. REP. No. 1065, supra note 62, at 24. 
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 
442(1)(b) (1986); Begin, supra note 51, at 84. 
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 
442(1)(c) (1986). 
79. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Begin, 
supra note 51, at 76. 
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foreign investment in United States markets.80 
III. INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN JAPAN 
Incidental to the limitations imposed by international law, the 
protection of American markets against the effect of Japanese in-
sider trading is entirely dependent on Japanese securities regula-
tions, which were modeled after the American system of regulation 
after World War II and continue to bear the characteristics of their 
American origin. 81 In spite of the similarities between American 
and Japanese insider trading regulation, each is applied very 
differently.82 
Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese market regula-
tors have avoided aggressive enforcement of insider trading laws, 
preferring instead to use more informal measures, including pri-
vate "warnings," administrative "guidance," and market "self-reg .. 
ulation."83 The Japanese laws are unenforced because their Ameri-
80. See Begin, supra note 51, at 89-90 (citing letters commenting on the legislation that 
would hold those who engage in the act or conduct of trading securities in the United States 
to have waived foreign secrecy laws by the nature of their conduct). 
81. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94; Tsunematsu, Y anese, Yasuda & Takuoka, 
Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 63 (R. Rosen ed. 1986); J . SCOTT, CAPITAL-
IST PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER 164 (1986); M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JA-
PAN 10 (1970). The original Securities Exchange Law passed by the Diet, Japan's national 
legislature, in 1947 included many features common to Japanese regulation, including the 
licensing of broker-dealers. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 10 (1970). 
Unlike the Securities and Exchange Commission, the regulatory body created by the Act 
served only an advisory function and had no rule-making or administrative authority. See 
id. The Occupation forces advised amendments to the Act before it would permit reopening 
of the exchanges, and in 1948 the Diet approved a new law which copied "almost verbatim 
[the] main provisions from the Securities [Exchange] Act of 1934 of the United States." Id. 
The Minister of Finance, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, bears responsibility 
for enforcing Japanese securities law. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION§ 11.02 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1980). Like the SEC, the 
Securities Bureau, which is one of seven bureaus in the Ministry, is charged with conducting 
investigations designed to uncover violations of the securities laws and, although it has less 
rule-making authority than its American contemporary, see id., it has significant influence 
over the drafting of new securities legislation. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
82. See Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers & Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 192 (1983). No more than one case involving insider trading case has 
ever been subject to an administrative or judicial proceeding in Japan, id. at 192; Sanger, 
supra note 73, at Dl, col. l.; Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420, even though insider trading is 
pervasive. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94; Schoen burger, supra note 25, at 38, col. 1. 
Insider trading in the United States, however, has been the source of much litigation and 
subject of intense public and Congressional attention. See also infra notes 91, 94. 
83. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 94. For a description of these informal con-
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can origm is inconsonant with the structure of Japanese 
government, which permits the bureaucracy to control social 
change,84 and because they erroneously presuppose the same his-
torical events that prompted the United States to adopt the regu-
lations on which they are based.86 The effect of each demonstrates 
the futility of uniform law as a method of eliminating the unique 
risks of a global securities market86 and exposes the recent amend-
ments to Japanese law as incapable of controlling insider trading 
in Japan. 
A. Formal Controls: Structural Dissimilarities 
1. General Anti-Fraud: Article 58 
f 
Prior to the passage of new legislation in 1988, the centerpiece 
of Japanese insider trading legislation was Article 58. of the Securi-
ties Exchange Law: 
No person shall commit an act set forth in the following Items: (1) 
[t]o employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect 
to buying, selling or other transactions of securities ... (2) [t]o 
obtain money or other property by using documents or by any rep-
resentation which contain an untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading ... [or] (3) [t]o make use of false 
quotation for the purpose to solicit buying selling or other transac-
tions of securities. 87 
Although the scope of the law is similar to section 17 of the 
trols, see infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text. 
84. See F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). The Diet's first 
Securities Exchange Law is evidence that social change is largely controlled by a system of 
"bureaucratic informality." Systems of informal guidance and mediation are symptoms of a 
government that is controlled by the bureaucracy interested in preserving its power from 
control by the judiciary or legislature. See id.; see also infra notes 196-215 and accompany-
ing text. 
85. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84. Japan's regulation came not as the result of depres-
sion brought about by market abuses, but as the result of losing World War II. Japan en-
dured a brief market crash in 1964, but it was the exclusive result of the Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax imposed on American investors. See Rudnitsky, Sloan & Fuhrman, supra note 12, 
at 143. Insider trading has always been more acceptable in socially-ordered Japan than in 
the fairness-minded United States. See infra text and accompanying notes 125-44. 
86. See Gruson, supra note 1, at 306-7 & n.6 (quoting KUBLER, REGULATORY PROBLEMS 
IN INTERNATIONALIZING TRADING MARKETS 10 (1985)). 
87. Securities Exchange Law art. 58 (translation provided by the Ministry of Finance in 
New York); cf. Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10; Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, at 62. 
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Securities Act of 1933 and section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,88 the laws differ significantly in the way that they are 
applied. Although American courts have fashioned a unsettled def-
inition of insider trading,89 the lack of judicial interpretation in Ja-
pan90 has spurred critics to argue that Article 58 is too broad.91 
88. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10. Specifically, Rule lOb-5 is 
worded similarly: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
in which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). Securities Exchange Law art. 58 does not mention interstate 
commerce, because Japan's system of government is unitary; all authority is vested in t.he 
national government and local government does not have any power, unless expressly dele-
gated to it by the Diet. 
89. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980). Courts in the United States have succeeded in fashioning a mutable definition of 
insider trading through frequent interpretations of Rule lOb-5, which, by the first time it 
was interpreted by the Supreme Court, was already one of "the most litigated provisions in 
the federal securities laws." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). The 
rule was initially applied to a wide variety of fraud cases, see, e.g., Superintendent of Insur-
ance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), but as a result of 
disagreement between Justice White, who thought a narrow application of the law justified 
by its limited purpose of ensuring "full and fair disclosure" and the existence of state reme-
dies, Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-79 (1976), and Justice Marshall, who 
gave more credence to the "broad anti-fraud purposes of the-... rule," National Securities, 
393 U.S. at 467, the rule was construed to apply only to fraud involving "deception, [or the] 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure" of a material fact. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. The 
courts further defined insider trading by limiting the definition of insider. The Court, while 
not expressly adopting the definition, considered an insider to be any person possessing 
material inside information and who, by reason of a his or her position as a director, officer, 
fiduciary, constructive insider or tippee, is under an affirmative duty to disclose the infor-
mation or refrain from trading. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36 (rejecting a cause of action 
based on mere possession of inside information); see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646 (no tippee 
liability when the tipper receives no personal gain). 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that the duty arises from possession of 
knowingly misappropriated information. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). Although the Court has yet to completely embrace it, Burger's definition has been 
used more often than the one briefly considered in Powell's majority opinion. See, e.g., 
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on remand, 772 F.2d 729 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 
1029, aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (the court was evenly divided on the appeal of the convic-
tion under Rule lOb-5). See also H.R. REP. No. 910, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 
1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6047 (commending the use of Burger's misap-
propriation theory in Carpenter). 
90. The only insight into the meaning of trading is the ordinance, which prohibits com-
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Unlike section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 
lOb-5,92 Article 58 does not permit an implied cause of action.93 
panies, their directors and employees, from buying oi' selling securities based upon confiden-
tial information obtained by reason of their business. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420. The 
ordinance was issued under the authority of Article 50 of the Securities Exchange Law. See 
id. 
91. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 81, § 11.10; M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 10 (1970). 
"Theoretically speaking, Article 58, notwithstanding its location, has a broad range of appli-
cation because of the phrases 'any person' and 'any other transaction.'" Tatsuta, Japan, in 
lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.10. 
See Sanger, supra note 73, at Dl, col. 1 (discussing the inadequate definition of "insider" 
under Article 58). The law approved last year provides a more thorough definition of insider 
trading. See id.; Securities Exchange Law arts. 190-2, 190-3 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 
1989); see also infra notes 227-39. 
92. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Unlike Article 
58, Rule lOb-5 is self-enforcing; the plaintiff need not argue that his or her injury is the 
result of a tort or breach of contract involving the violation of Rule lOb-5. See id. at 730. 
The inefficacy of state tort law in cases involving securities fraud is thought to be one of the 
major reasons for the courts' willingness to imply a private cause of action. See R. HAMIL-
TON, CORPORATIONS 879 (3d ed. 1986). 
The first case to construe Rule lOb-5 as including an implied cause of action held that 
"although not expressly provided for in [Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934], a remedy by civil action to enforce such duties and liabilities [created by the Act] was 
available to plaintiffs." Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 
1947). Individual standing under Rule lOb-5 was quickly adopted in the lower courts and 
was eventually accepted by the Supreme Court "with virtually no discussion [of] the over-
whelming consensus .... " Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (citing Superintendent of 
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972)). 
In 1952, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit restricted the liberal standing 
conferred by Kardon to purchasers and sellers in cases involving "misrepresentation usually 
associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than [the] fraudulent misrepresen-
tation of corporate affairs." Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 
1952). In Birnbaum, the court refused to apply the rule because the plaintiffs neither pur-
chased nor sold their shares during the period between the misrepresentation and its even-
tual disclosure. See id. at 508-509. Although some courts advocated a more liberal standard, 
see, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), the Supreme Court eventually adopted the rule, closing the 
door on lOb-5 claims by plaintiffs dissuaded from purchasing or selling shares by the mis-
representation or omission, and others who might suffer a loss in the value of their invest-
ments as a result of a purchase or sale. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-38. The rule 
was adopted to limit the use of the rule in nuisance suits and facilitate the consideration of 
proof, id. at 741, 744, by limiting "the class of plaintiffs to those who have at least dealt in 
the security to which the ... representation or omission relates." Id. at 751. The rule does 
not "limit the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief .... " Id. For a 
more enlightened discussion of implied causes of action under Rule lOb-5, see Ashford, Im-
plied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 227 (1984). 
93. See Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES 
REGULATION, supra note 81, at 63; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.12. 
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Persons victimized by violations of Article 58 may seek an injunc-
tion from the court on application to the Ministry of Finance and 
may seek civil remedies "based on general civil liability provisions 
relating to torts and contracts [and] contained in the Civil Code 
and Commercial Code. "94 To recover damages under the Civil 
Code, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted illegally 
and did so willfully, and that this action was the cause of the 
plaintiff's injury.96 The stigma attached to the use of litigation96 
and the difficulty of proving injury and causation in cases involving 
securities traded on a public exchange97 explain the lack of private 
action under Article 58 and the pervasion of insider trading in Jap-
anese markets. 
2. Market Manipulation: Article 189 
Market manipulation is much more acute in Japan than in the 
United States because of the extremely thin float in Japan's largest 
exchanges. Sixty to seventy percent of the outstanding shares on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange are held by companies in long-term re-
ciprocal arrangements to cement trade relationships. 98 The thin 
float allows Japan's four largest securities firms, whose transactions 
account for more than fifty percent of the volume on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange,99 to influence an issuer's share price by control-
ling a small percentage of its outstanding shares.100 
94. See Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Takuoka, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES 
REGULATION, supra note 81, at 63; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.14; see also MINPO [Civil Code] arts. 96, 
709; SHOHO [Commercial Code] art. 266-3, ~ 2. 
95. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 81, § 11.12. 
96. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
97. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 81, § 11.14. Violations of Article 58 were not subject to criminal penal-
ties, but violations of Rule lOb-5 are substantial. Compare Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420 and 
Securities Exchange Law art. 200 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) with 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) 
(Supp. IV 1986), as amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678. A 
person who willingly violates Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Rule 
lOb-5 "shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than ten years or both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural per-
son, a fine not exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. IV 
1986), amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678. 
98. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 93. 
99. See id. The four largest firms are Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi. See id. 
100. See id. at 93. The extent of Japanese institutional investment in the securities 
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Market manipulation is regulated in the same manner that it 
is controlled in the United States.101 Securities Exchange Law Arti-
cle 189 requires directors, officers and ten percent shareholders to 
disgorge profits resulting from a purchase and sale occurring 
within a six month period.102 Like section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the provision does not apply to a share-
holder who is neither an officer nor a director and holds less than 
ten percent at the time of sale or at the time of purchase.103 
The law was weakened, however, by the repeal of Article 188 
in 1953, which like section 16(a), required insiders to report 
changes in their holdings to the Ministry of Finance.10• Market 
regulators were unable to prevent market manipulation because 
they could no longer monitor trades by corporate insiders.105 Not 
surprisingly, one element of the Diet's response to the Recruit 
scandal was the reenactment of a significant portion of Article 188. 
B. Informal Controls 
1. Market Exchanges 
Limited control of Japanese markets has been achieved 
through administrative guidance and the threat implicit in the 
Ministry's ability to revoke or suspend the licenses required of all 
securities companies106 and the exchanges to which they belong. 
The Ministry of Finance issues licenses to securities firms on the 
condition that they continue to meet abstract criteria. 107 The crite-
markets is in sharp contrast to the extent of Japanese individual investment. See M. TAT-
SUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 2 (1970). Savings deposits account for more than 
44% of individual pecuniary assets, while investment in securities is less than 16%. See id. 
101. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1982). 
102. See Securities Exchange Law art. 189; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAP-
ITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13. 
103. See Securities Exchange Law art. 189; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAP-
ITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13. 
104. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG-
ULATION, supra note 81, § 11.13; Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers & Insider Trad-
ing, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 82, at 194. The Article was repealed 
because it did not require disclosure by beneficial owners and invited insiders to trade in 
shares using the names of other persons. See Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers & 
Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 82, at 194. 
105. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 420. To combat market manipulation, the Ministry 
was forced to consume resources that would have been used to combat insider trading under 
Article 58. See id. at 421-22. 
106. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 84 (1970); Securities Exchange 
Law art. 35. A firm which does not possess a license is barred from membership in any 
exchange. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 84 (1970). 
107. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 71 (1970). The criteria include 
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ria give the Ministry broad discretion to revoke or suspend a li-
censes if the licensee violates the law, an administrative order pur-
suant to the law, or any other qualification attached to the 
license.108 
The Ministry can also influence market behavior through the 
licensing requirements established for securities exchanges.109 The 
Ministry must approve the original version and any subsequent al-
teration110 of the exchange's constitution, business regulations and 
entrustment contract.111 The Ministry retains the power to revoke 
or suspend an exchange license112 and may order an exchange to 
change its operation. 113 The Ministry of Finance is empowered to 
revoke or suspend the license of any exchange or order the dismis-
sal of any of its officers for failure to discipline any member that 
has violated securities laws, regulations, or exchange rules. 114 
While the efficacy of administrative guidance enforced by the 
implicit threat of the revocation should not be underestimated, the 
Ministry's ability to sanction firms that defy its guidance is limited 
by the impracticality of revokation and suspension and the need 
for more flexible penalties. While informal regulation is capable of 
controlling complex markets, any system which lacks enforceable 
sanctions is likely to be ineffective as the number of market par-
ticipants increases. m The Ministry's inability to enforce securities 
assurances that the applicant has (1) sufficient financial ability to carry out its proposed 
business, (2) sufficient knowledge and experience to carry out its business fairly and ade-
quately and has good social standing, and (3) services that are necessary and appropriate in 
light of the economic circumstances. See id. at 70. The last criterion should be read "to 
prevent excessive competition among securities companies." Id. at 70. 
108. See id. at 71. 
109. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG-
ULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02. Exchanges can not be incorporated if they do not possess a 
license granted by the Ministry of Finance. See id. 
110. Id.; see Securities Exchange Law arts. 82 ii 2, 85-1 ii 3. 
111. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 83-84 (1970). The exchange's 
constitution must provide for the discipline of its members, by means of expulsion, suspen-
sion, or the imposition of fines, for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of 
trade or which is a violation of securities laws, administrative orders, or the rules of the 
exchange. See id. at 83; Securities Exchange Law art. 98. 
112. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 83-84 (1970); see Securities Ex-
change Law art. 155. 
113. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG-
ULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law art. 156. 
114. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG-
UL~TION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law art. 155. 
115. See Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987 
CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 375, 378. 
19
Imhof: The Pathology of Insider Trading and Japan's Amended Securities E
Published by SURFACE, 1990
254 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:235 
laws in the public interest116 is evidence that the Japanese market, 
now one of the largest in the world, has outgrown the usefulness of 
administrative guidance. 
2. Over-the-Counter Markets 
Notwithstanding its tremendous growth, the Japanese over-
the-counter ("OTC") market is very small by American stan-
dards.117 The market is supervised by members of the Japan Fed-
eration of Securities Firm Associations.118 Its regulatory authority 
is less comprehensive than that exercised by the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers ("NASD") in the United States119 in part 
because firms trading in the OTC market are not required to be 
members. 
The Ministry of Finance, which supervises associations in 
much the same way it supervises the exchanges, requires each 
member association to ,register its constitution, Rules of Fair Prac-
tice, a Uniform Practice Code, and resolutions of its board of direc-
tors.120 Although associations have never sought to expel a member 
on their own initiative, they have not hesitated to expel members 
whose licenses have been revoked by the Ministry or whose mem-
bership in an exchange has been terminated.121 
IV. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 
Before the likely consequences of the Diet's newest proscrip-
tions against insider trading can be fully understood, consideration 
116. See S. SETHI, JAPANESE BUSINESS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 118 (1975). In the only in-
sider trading case to date, government prosecutors had enough evidence in 1973 to indict 
three of the four largest brokerage firms for alleged manipulation of the stock of Kyodo 
Shiryo Co, a leading food producer, but were dissuaded by the Ministry of Finance because 
the executives of the brokerage firms involved promised to stop all manipulative practices. 
See id. The case was finally concluded in July 1988, and resulted in suspended sentences 
and $3,200 fine for two Kyodo Shiryo executives and four brokers from Diawa and Nikko 
Securities. See Sanger, supra note 73. 
117. See Perlmutter, Developments in the Japanese Securities Markets, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 2, at 95. One hundred forty stocks are traded in 
Japan's over-the-counter market, but more than five thousand are traded in the American 
over-the-counter market. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 78-79 (1970). This may be be-
cause the associations function more as interest groups representing the securities industry 
than professional organizations legitimately concerned with self-regulation. See id. at 80. 
120. See id.; Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION, supra note 81, § 11.02; Securities Exchange Law arts. 67-78. 
121. See M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 80 (1970). 
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must be given to the weaknesses that explain the government's in-
ability to effectively enforce existing regulation. The failure is 
largely the result of three features unique to the Japanese political 
and economic system. First, the existing laws, which are largely the 
product of American experience, are insensitive to Japan's tradi-
tional tolerance of insider trading and unique distaste for litiga-
tion. Second, the historical development of Japanese business has 
produced a network of tight business relationships inimical to ef-
fective regulation. Finally, the bureaucracy's interest in preserving 
its broad control over social change has forced it to abandon all 
but the most informal means of controlling insider trading. 
A. Tolerance and Social Relativism 
A frequent justification for the failure of insider trading regu-
lation in Japan is that it was drafted by the occupation forces at 
the end of World War II and embraces American concepts of indi-
viduality and unfettered competition, which are an anathema in a 
society built on social relativism and cooperation.122 This tension 
limits the government's ability to control insider trading within the 
unique and traditional structure of Japanese business, which 
makes inside information very accessible, or within a society whose 
tolerance of insider trading eliminates the risk of using it. 
Japanese business and legal philosophy place the goals of har-
mony and cooperation above all others123 and much of Japanese 
behavior is structured to avoid conflict. This philosophy is mani-
fest in the unmitigated significance of seniority124 in individual ad-
vancement in government125 and business, 126 and the practice of 
122. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84; T . LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR (1976). 
For example, much of American securities litigation is brought under private causes of ac-
tion, a means that is encouraged by a dominant sense of individualism and private rights, 
but which would be unworkable in a society in which individualism is discouraged. See 
supra text accompanying notes 61, 63. 
123. B. DEMENTE, JAPANESE ETIQUETTE & ETHICS IN BUSINESS 37 (5th ed. 1987). The 
concept is called wa, and is roughly translated as "peace and harmony." Id. at 36. 
124. See id. This relationship is best defined by the terms sempai, meaning "senior," 
and kohai, meaning "junior." Id. The basis for the sempai-kohai relationship is based on a 
number of factors, which include schools attended, year of graduation, educational level 
achieved, location of experience, company worked for, time with the company, and its size 
and significance, among others. See id. This relationship has more significance in Japanese 
business relationships than in American business relationships. See id. 
125. See C. YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLITICS 10 (1968). 
126. See id. at 24-25. More emphasis is placed on seniority than on talent or accom-
plishment when entertaining candidates for advancement to new bureaucratic posts or to 
new positions in Japanese business. See id.; see also infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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masking truths that would embarrass another or oneself.121 Such 
behavior would not only compromise harmony but would embar-
rass the individuals involved.128 
Another manifestation is the significance of group-minded be-
havior, which emphasizes the functions and the goals of the group 
and minimizes the experience, qualifications, and responsibilities 
of the individual.129 This type of behavior is most common in Japa-
nese business130 and is responsible. for the Western perception that 
all Japanese industry functions as a single economic unit.131 With 
the exception of a few isolated circumstances, 132 the Japanese have 
maintained the traditional sanctions against competitive behavior 
and continue "to promote the concept and practice of group action 
and team spirit. m 33 The greatest dishonor is to bring dishonor 
This may explain the conduct of Recruit president Ezoe, which may have been designed to 
win the recognition of Japan's business and political elite for his firm, which, despite its 
phenomenal success, · was young and operated in a business that was not widely respected. 
See supra note 16. 
127. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 20. 
128. See id. "It is a serious breach of etiquette in Japan to criticize someone ... or to 
disagree ... in public, or to be right when [another] is in error." Id. at 107; see T. LEBRA, 
supra note 122, at 42. 
129. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 35; see T. LEBRA, supra note 122, at 25. 
130. "The company is the community, and home is just where [the employees] sleep." 
B. DEMENTE, supra note 123 at 9 (quoting Yamamoto). 
131. See Spencer, Japan: Stimulus or Scapegoat, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 123, 128 (1983). 
132. See B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 56. These circumstances include, but are not 
limited to, competition in school, in sports, and to some extent, between rival groups. See 
id. The traditional attitudes toward cooperation has gradually eroded antitrust law in Ja-
pan, and resulted in most Japanese companies having an allegiance to one of several loosely 
organized enterprise groups, or kigyoshudan. See infra, note 190 and accompanying text. 
Competition between these groups, and among unaffiliated companies, is very intense, 
"often going beyond what Western businessmen consider rational behavior." B. DEMENTE, 
supra note 123, at 62. 
Mr. Ezoe's behavior is more understandable in light of the intense competition among 
companies that are not members of the group and the disadvantages that he suffered as a 
result of not being an executive in one of the affiliated companies. Success largely depends 
upon getting into the right group. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 28. "Since both the 
grouping and advancement-by-seniority systems put everything on a personal basis," per-
sonal relationships among executives are extremely important. Id. at 30. "One company will 
not do business with another until the managers who would be involved . . . have developed 
personal relations ... [a] process [that] is prescribed, meticulous, and time consuming." Id.; 
see Zoglin, supra note 20, at 419; Yoder & Kanabayashi, supra note 14, at 11. One way of 
speeding up the process is through the practice of o'tsukaimono, or the exchange of favors, 
see B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 51, by which stock is offered in exchange for introduc-
tions, which can be used to get new business clients. Unlike business introductions in the 
United States, requests made by business with a proper referral are rarely refused, espe-
cially if the introduction is "from a valued friend, superior, or important business contact," 
for fear of embarrassing the person making the introduction. Id. at 46. 
133. B. DEMENTE, supra note 123, at 56. 
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upon the group, either by acting dishonorably, or by exposing the 
dishonorable acts of another inside134 or outside the group. 136 
Unlike legal systems based on Judeo-Christian foundations, 
the Japanese system does not view laws as having an absolute 
value. 136 Instead, the Japanese believe that ningeusei is the only 
absolute137 and that positive law.fails to "bind people by a hundred 
percent .... [B]oth conscious dissention and dictatorial suppres-
sion are alien" to the function of law in Japan.138 
The importance of harmony and the repudiation of legal abso-
lutism explain, in part, the failure of Japanese· insider trading reg-
ulation. The difficulties engendered by the lack of an independent 
cause of action are only exacerbated by public hostility to victims 
seeking judicial remedies, who are thought to violate· harmony by 
resorting to legal conflict.139 As a result, the Ministry's informal 
controls remain the only means by which to regulate insider 
trading. 
B. The Kigyoshudan and Modern Japanese Free Enterprise 
Another justification for the failure of Japanese insider trading 
regulation is the importance of cooperation1• 0 and close relation-
ships among leading corporations and executives1• 1 in the same en-
terprise group.142 The relationships provide an incentive for execu-
tives to trade inside information and have made insider trading an 
acceptable, if not expected, way of doing business. 
The unique relationships among Japanese businesses began 
shortly after the industrial revolution.143 To foster industrializa-
tion, the government took an active role in the economy by estab-
134. T . LEBRA, supra note 122, at 36. The story most often used to illustrate this con-
cept is that of a child whose family was ostracized by the citizens of the town in which they 
lived because the child wrote a letter to a local newspaper exposing the corruption of a town · 
official. See id. 
135. See id. at 11. The result is that "[t]he Japanese tend to hold everyone involved in 
a conflict responsible for it." Id.; see supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
136. T . LEBRA, supra note 122, at 11. 
137. See id. Ninensei, the law of "humanity" is the "law behind law, ... words behind 
words [and] reason behind reason ... . "Id. 
138. See id. at 30 (quoting I. BENDASAN, JAPANESE AND JEWS 81 (1972)). 
139. S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 107, 113 (describing the difficulties that the victims of 
industrial pollution encountered in litigation for personal injuries). 
140. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra note 105. 
142. See supra note 105. 
143. See T. ADAMS, A FINANCIAL HtsTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 10 (1964). 
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lishing nationalized companies.10 The companies were eventually 
sold to families, which supported the state policy of industrializa-
tion.145 The families quickly consolidated their interests into large 
financial . and industrial groups, called zaibatsu, which were c0n-
trolled by family-owned holding companies charged with the re-
sponsibility of marketing the group's products and supported by a 
bank with the requisite capital.146 The zaibatsu grew in size pri-
marily because the lack of efficient stock markets forced new com-
panies seeking capital to align with one of the four large zaibatsu 
or to pool resources to form smaller groups. 147 By World War II, 
the "Big Four" zaibatsu controlled more than twenty-four percent 
of Japan's paid-in capital.148 
After World War II, the Allies blamed the zaibatsu for Ja-
pan's militarization and quickly realized they were incompatable 
with their plans for economic democratization.149 General Douglas 
144. See id. Industrialization was part of the policy of fokuku kyohei, which embodied 
the imperial government's conscious decision to adopt Western capital techniques to achieve 
military and economic parity with the West. See id. The nationalized companies provided 
postal, telegraph and railway service, and manufactured ships, armaments, iron, steel, tex-
tiles and beer. See id.; J. SCOTT, supra note 81, at 159. 
145. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 2. The families included Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo and Yasuda. See id. The sales were accomplished with the help of subsidies and 
low interest loans. See id. at 3. 
146. See J. SCOTT, supra note 81, at 159. 
147. See id. at 160. 
148. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 38, n.17; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 171. The 
zaibatsu controlled more than 49% of Japan's financial industry and more than 32% of 
Japan's heavy industry. T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 171. 
149. See Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER 79 
(1973); T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 166. The terms for Japan;s surrender included the 
elimination of the "authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the peo-
ple of Japan into embarking on world conquest," the destruction of Japan's war-making 
power, the complete disarmament of the Japanese military forces, and the removal of all 
obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people. T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 164 (quoting the Potsdam Declaration). "Japan shall 
be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain the economy and permit the exac-
tion of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To 
this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Even-
tual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted." Id. (quoting the 
Potsdam Declaration). 
Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the 
ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy 
of the Supreme Commander ... [t]o prohibit the retention or selection for places 
of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japa-
nese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends ... and [t]o favor a program for 
the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exer-
cised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry. 
Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra, at 79. 
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MacArthur, encouraged by American ambivalence,150 ignored pro-
tests by the Far Eastern Commission ("FEC")151 and rebuilt the 
Japanese economy using a distinctly American pattern. 152 
In October 1945, MacArthur approved the Yasuda Plan, 153 
which transferred zaibatsu holdings to the Holding Company Liq-
uidation Commission ("HCLC") for liquidation.154 The Occupation 
forces also required that fifty-six designated members of the four 
primary zaibatsu families transfer their personal holdings to· the 
HCLC for liquidation,155 and demanded the resignation of all hold-
ing company directors and auditors.156 
In 194 7, inconsistencies in American policy157 paved the way 
150. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 165. "Although every effort will be made by 
consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the 
conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principle Allied 
powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United 
States will govern." Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN 
READER, supra note 149, at 8. 
151. The FEC was charged with formulating "policies, principles and standards in con-
formity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender 
may be accomplished," T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 164-165, and was empowered to review 
the directives and activities of MacArthur, who retained administrative authority. See id. , 
152. See id. at 165. 
153. See id. at 169. Ironically the Yasuda zaibatsu was the only one of the four groups 
that failed to reemerge from the dissolution. Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in 
2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 79; J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162. Fuji Bank, the 
primary bank in the Yasuda zaibatsu, nevertheless became the center of a new group 
shortly after the war. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162; see infra note 146 and accompa-
nying text. Democratization was ordered even though the bureaucracy and business groups 
were successful in shifting much of the blame for militarization to the military. Livingston, 
Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 79. 
154. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 170-71; see The Yasuda Plan, reprinted in 2 THE 
JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 80. "Of the eighty-three designated holding companies, 
thirty were completely dissolved and the remaining were effectively stripped of their charac-
ter as holding companies." T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 170-71. Following democratization, 
the "Big Four" zaibatsu controlled only little more than 10% of Japan's paid-in capital, less 
than 24% of the financial industry and less than 15% of heavy industry. See id. at 171. 
155. See J . ScoTT, supra note 81, at 161. In compensation for the securities surrendered 
to the HCLC, shareholders were issued non-negotiable government bonds. See id. A total of 
200 million shares where liquidated through the HCLC. See T . ADAMS, supra note 143, at 
170. 
156. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 169-70. 
157. See id. In 1947, under the authority of General MacArthur, the Japanese govern-
ment enacted the Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power to 
abrogate "private monopoly and restraint of trade, ... interlocking directorates, [and] in-
tercorporate security ownership ... as will provide equal opportunity to firms and individ-
uals to compete ... on a democratic basis." Id. at 169. The law "prohibited firms, with the 
exception . of financial institutions, from acquiring the stock of other firms; . . . financial 
institutions with more than five million yen in assets were forbidden from acquiring more 
than five percent of the stock of any other firm. Interlocking directorates ... were re-
stricted." Id . at 171. Under pressure from Japanese business and as the result of the need 
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for the reconsolidation of enterprise groups destroyed by democra-
tization during the American Occupation.168 Although the large 
zaibatsu had been destroyed, Japan's largest financial institutions 
remained intact and retained much of their equity holdings in old 
zaibatsu corporations.159 The banks became a catalyst for the 
reemergence of many of the prewar enterprise groups, now called 
kigyoshudan or kieretsu, 160 which retained the names of the 
zaibatsu that they replaced.161 With the end of the Occupation on 
September 8, 1951,162 the government was free to relax the anti-
monopoly law163 and satisfy the interests of businesses eager to 
join a burgeoning global economy.16" The revision of the anti-mo-
for a strong ally in the Pacific, see Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, Annotation, in 2 THE 
JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 4, the United States ceded to pressure to limit the appli-
cation of the regulation to excessive concentration. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 35. In 
the end, fewer than 11 of the original 325 firms targeted were ordered split or divested. See 
id. at 36. 
158. See Letter from Acting Political Advisor Atcheson to President Truman, Novem-
ber 5, 1945, reprinted in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 149, at 12, 13 (1973). 
159. See J . ScoTI, supra note 81, at 162. 
160. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 35-36. The term applied to those groups that 
reemerged as a result of banking relationships. See id. Japanese firms are closely tied to 
their group banks: "Among the 118 enterprises affiliated to kigyoshudan, there were only six 
in which the group bank was not the primary source of borrowing." J . ScoTI, supra note 81, 
at 186. While they are not as closely tied to their member banks as the member firms of the 
prewar zaibatsu, because of the increased capital demands required by the growth of high 
technology, see id. at 162; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 257-58, in most of the cases where a 
second lender was involved, the second lender was the Industrial Bank of Japan, an unaffili-
ated central bank, and not the bank of a rival group. See J . ScoTI, supra note 81, at 186. 
161. See J . ScoTI, supra note 81, at 186. The Mitsubishi and Mitsui zaibatsu 
reemerged through a process involving numerous mergers and consolidations after having 
been broken into nearly 200 successor companies. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 36. 
162. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.l.A.S. No. 2490, 136 
U.N.T.S. 45. 
163. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 167. The law was relaxed by exemptions en-
acted by the Japanese Diet, and indifferent enforcement by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. See id. A revision enacted 
on August 6, 1953, limits the application of the law to "actions that restrain competition in 
certain transactions in violation of the public interest and actions involving unfair methods 
of competition [and] permit[s] agreements in the case of necessity, provided they do not run 
counter to the public interest." Id. at 158. The repeal of the Trade Association Law also 
fostered the reemergence of the zaibatsu. See id. at 159-61. In spite of weaker antitrust 
laws, hostile takeovers are rare in Japan because of the stigma of unharmonious behavior. 
See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 421; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 19 (1983). 
"[T]he impetus for stronger enforcement of insider trading laws, which largely arose in the 
United States as a result of dramatic market movements preceding public announcement of 
such activities, has been absent in Japan." Zoglin, supra note 20, at 421. 
164. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 139; T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 257. Japan 
thought the revision of the law necessary to help her compete in international trade and 
while the law might have served a purpose in the United States, where history and tradition 
advocated unfettered competition, the law served no purpose in Japan, where public senti-
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1990], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss2/3
1990] Japan's Amended Securities Law 261 
nopoly law gave legitimacy to the enterprise groups. 
The kigyoshudan differ from prewar zaibatsu in ways which 
explain the impotency of Japanese insider trading regulation. Like 
the zaibatsu, the postwar kigyoshudan consist of a symbiosis of 
industries, which typically include a bank, trust company, insur-
ance company, real estate brokerage, trade company and heavy in-
dustries, that compete intensely with firms outside the group.166 
Unlike zaibatsu firms, which were related through family-owned 
holding companies, the postwar groups are related by a system of 
horizontal relationships that include interlocking directorates, re-
ciprocal shareholdings, and personal relationships among execu-
tives.166 The reciprocal shareholdings in Japan, unlike the typically 
vertical relationships among American companies, 167 exist not for 
the purpose of investment, but to enhance the stability and 
strength of the group.188 The largest shareholders in a large J apa-
nese company are the other firms in its group, and they typically 
control a larger percentage of shares than majority shareholders in 
American and British companies.169 Effective control is vested in 
the group even when no single firm has a dominant interest.170 
In addition to these groups, ·economic organizations171 and so-
cial groups also play a significant role in the management of J apa-
nese business. While the purpose of the economic organizations is 
primarily political, their influence in government is much more sig-
ment favored consolidation in part due to the prewar prosperity enjoyed as a result of the 
zaibatsu. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 166-68. 
165. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 38-39. 
166. See id. at 39-40; J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 162. 
167. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 163. While the predominant intercompany relation-
ships in the United States are vertical, in the form of a parent and a subsidiary, this form of 
control in Japan is limited to a few groups, including Nissan and Toyota, that share attrib-
utes of both horizontal and vertical control. See id. 
168. See id. at 168. 
169. See id. at 167-68, 178. 
170. See id. Modernization may erode many obstacles to effective enforcement, but the 
trend is likely to be more gradual than the growth of Japan's securities markets will permit. 
See T. LEBRA, supra note 122, at 257. Among the changes, which could improve the efficacy 
of insider trading regulation, is an increase in individualism, see id. But see S. SETHI, supra 
note 116, at 44-45 (minimizing the probable consequences), and the proliferation of high 
technology companies that, because of their capital demands and untraditional nature, are 
not affiliated with any enterprise group. See Packard, The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis, 66 
FOREIGN AFF. 348, 353 (1987); see also supra note 161. 
171. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 34. The organizations include the Federation of 
Economic Organizations, the Japan Federation of Employer's Associations, the Japan Com-
mittee for Economic Development, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Ja-
pan Industrial Club. See id. 
27
Imhof: The Pathology of Insider Trading and Japan's Amended Securities E
Published by SURFACE, 1990
262 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:235 
nificant than similar organizations in the United States.172 Even 
more influential are the ·social clubs, or shacho-kai, which are or-
ganized as the ruling bodies of the enterprise groups.173 Member-
ship in the clubs includes the presidents of the major member en-
terprises, who meet regularly to set group policy.174 Each president 
has the power to vote his company's shares, giving the group effec-
tive control over the policy of each individual member corporation. 
The club is dependent on cooperation between its members to pro-
tect the financial interests of its members,17l~ who by the nature of 
their reciprocal shareholdings, are very dependent on one another. 
The traditional structure of the Japanese enterprise groups is 
designed to foster the exchange of inside information among its 
member firms and their executives, and may be the single greatest 
contributor to the failure of Japanese insider trading regulation. 
While the exchange of this information improves access to scarce 
resources176 and makes Japan more competitive in world mar-
kets, 177 it also provides firms with, access to valuable information, 
which, as the result of the large position that each must take in the 
shares of other members, can be used to make or save considerable 
sums of money. Cooperation among member firms not only facili-
tates but encourages insider trading. The structure is most fright-
ening because the four largest brokerage firms, which are responsi-
ble for almost half the total sales in the industry,178 are themselves 
members of groups that include companies whose shares they ac-
tively trade. 179 
Contributing to the insider trading problem is the failure of 
the government to enforce the formal and informal mechanisms of 
control. This may be the result of pervasive influence of business 
172. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 206-07. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying 
text. 
173. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 168. Many groups have little to do with the man-
agement of the enterprise groups. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. 
176. See id. at 163. 
177. See id. "[E]nterprise grouping reflects an attempt to counter the uncertainty of a 
rapidly changing environment by maximizing the flow of information between associated 
enterprises." Id. 
178. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG-
ULATION, supra note 81, § 11.04. The four largest firms, Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi and 
Diawa, account for almost half the sales in the industry and more than 90% of all under-
writing. The top 12 firms account for two-thirds of all sales in the industry. See id. 
179. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 192. The increase in the number of unaffiliated 
high technology companies may be reducing the importance of the kigyoshudan. See id. 
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in Japanese politics.180 The influence is both latent, as evidenced 
by the dominance of four securities firms in the Japanese mar-
ket, 181 and patent, 182 as evidenced by the involvement of trade 
groups and business organizations in politics. Corporate political 
contributions are regarded as investments to preserve the interests 
of business and to ensure profits for its enterprises. 183 Big business 
has the power of life and death in Japanese politics; it helps to 
decide the makeup of the bureaucracy, legislation that does not 
have its approval is never introduced, and candidacy for Prime 
Minister is "unthinkable without its tacit approval. "184 Japanese 
business "holds a virtual veto over all important economic deci-
sions."1HThe importance of business in Japanese politics, coupled 
with the social186 and political187 preferences for informal control, 
have produced sanctions too weak to prevent repeated corporate 
misconduct.188 
180. See J. ScoTT, supra note 81, at 159. Business has always had close ties to Japanese 
politics. See id. In the 1930s, the major force behind the Seiyukai party was the Mitsui 
zaibatsu, whose representatives included Prime Minister Ito. See id. The rival party, the 
Kenseikai, was supported by the rival Mitsubishi zaibatsu. See id. 
181. See supra note 157. While informal sanctions are available for the discipline of 
these firms, they are limited to reprimand and the suspension or revocation of license, and 
the resulting expulsion from organized exchanges. See supra note 120-21 and accompanying 
text. Few would expect the government to suspend any firm whose involvement in the mar-
ket is so essential. 
182. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 422. The same large securities firms are strong politi-
cal allies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"). See id. 
183. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 80. 
184. Id. at 33. The nature of the relationship is perhaps best exemplified by the fight 
between two economic organizations for the leadership of the business community. The 
Sanken, now the largest organization, was able to defeat its opponent, the FEO, by advocat-
ing close ties with the government to the point of becoming a corporate state. See S. SETHI, 
supra note 116, at 34-35. 
185. S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 36. 
186. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
187. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
188. See S. SETHI, supra note 116, at 109, 112. Sethi argues that these factors have 
made many forms of corporate misconduct more pervasive in Japan than in the United 
States. See id. Japanese regulation, especially in the form of consumer and environmental 
protection, usually lags similar American regulation by up to two years, perhaps to avoid 
one-time losses in Japanese markets by avoiding the increased costs of unilateral regulation 
until similar regulations are enforced in other countries. See id. at 107-9. Not wishing to 
appear indifferent in its efforts to combat the problem, the two year lag is filled with lots of 
rhetoric, enlarging the gap between the regulations' expected and actual efficacy. See id. at 
123. 
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C. Bureaucratic lnformalism189 
Many of the cultural and structural justifications for the un-
abashed tolerance of insider trading fail to completely explain why 
the government, with all its tools for affecting social change, has 
only recently made an effort to rectify the problem of insider trad-
ing.190 The bureaucracy, which drafts almost all legi~lation for ap-
proval by the Diet, 191 has always had tremendous power in Japan, 
even before World War 11.192 This power, combined with the pecu-
liar structure of Japanese government, has given the bureaucracy 
an incentive to embrace many of the traditional informal systems 
as a means of preserving its control over social change. 
The Japanese bureaucracy was nearly unaffected by the de-
mocratization that so deeply affected the structure of Japanese 
business.193 Its importance in prewar Japan19" left it well suited to 
assume a significant amount of political control in postwar Japan, 
which it shares in a triumvirate with the leaders of the Liberal 
Democratic Party19~ and top business management.196 Most legisla-
tion, although it must be approved by the Diet, is subject to little 
modification after it is drafted by the middle level bureaucrats who 
are ultimately responsible for enforcing it.197 Traditionally, the bu-
reaucrats have tended to favor abstract regulatory legislation that 
189. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84. 
190. See recent amendments to Securities Exchange Law approved by the Diet in 1988 
and scheduled to be implemented in April 1989, infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text. 
191. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14; R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name: 
Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 201, 319 (1983) 
(Practising Law Institute A4-4052). 
192. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14. 
193. See Maki, The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan, in 2 THE JAPAN READER, supra note 
149, at 28-29. 
194. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 7-8; see R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other 
Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 
191, at 319. 
195. See J . ScoTT, supra note 81, at 193 n.4. The LDP has dominated Japanese politics 
since its creation in 1955. See id. It was created by the merger of the Seiyukai, Progressive, 
and Democratic parties. See id. The Progressive and Democratic parties split from the Min-
seito Party, which was the predecessor of the Mitsubishi-controlled Kenseikai Party. See id. 
196. See T. ADAMS, supra note 143, at 14. The Japanese system of unitary government 
differs significantly from the American federalism: local authority is delegated from the na-
tional government to the local government through specific acts of the Japanese legislature 
or Diet. See Tatsuta, Japan, in lOA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGU-
LATION, supra note 81 , § 11.01; M. TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 4 (1970). Japan 
also uses a parliamentary system of government. See J . MAKI, CouRT AND CONSTITUTION IN 
JAPAN (1964) . 
197. See C. Y ANAGA, supra note 125, at 7-8. The drafting process usually involves dis-
cussion of proposed legislation with private primarily business. See id. 
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leaves many important administrative decisions and detailed appli-
cation to be worked out by subsequent regulation, much of which 
is written by the same bureaucrats.198 The bureaucracy's ability to 
draft legislation also enables it to control public policy by ensuring 
that controversies are decided with the use of informal administra-
tive orchestration, and that private causes of action, which would 
shift the power of interpretation to the courts, are avoided. 199 Thus 
traditional Japanese systems of government built upon informal 
control may be no more than an excuse for preserving bureaucratic 
policymaking. "Japanese resistance [to aggressive regulation] is not 
necessarily because of tradition but because of the ability of those 
in power to consciously use it through the disguise of consensus to 
advance social change."200 
The informalism, which the bureaucracy has embraced to en-
sure its control over social policy, has produced the ineffective leg-
islative and judicial changelings that are at the root of the insider 
trading problem in Japan. Instead of clear statutory norms, the law 
is replaced by "moral exhortation" and administrative guidance 
that may be well-suited to bureaucratic control, but lacks the real-
istic sanctions necessary to make it effective. 201 The informality 
makes new policies appear to be the inevitable product of custom 
and consensus,202 and minimizes the opportunity for individuals to 
use formal judicial processes to challenge the dominant social 
consciousness. 203 
To avoid losing control over securities regulation, the Ministry 
of Finance has erected substantial barriers to shareholder litiga-
tion, which include the inability to bring class action suits, the 
high costs of litigation,204 and the limitations imposed by seeking 
198. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND POLITICS 197 (1973); 
R. Brown, A Lawyer by Any Other Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 191, at 319. 
199. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 211. "[T]he maintenance of legal informality ... 
would be seriously compromised, if not rendered impossible, by simultaneous judicial activ-
ity in the same policy areas." Id. at 226. 
200. Id. at 220-21. The bureaucrats, who are responsible for drafting legislation, have a 
considerable incentive to conform and play safe. See C. YANAGA, supra note 125, at 99. 
Under the system of automatic escalation, a civil servant is assured of a promotion to the 
level simply by serving time, provided he commits no serious blunder. See id. 
201. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 14, 209. 
202. See id. at 208. Japanese law seldom leads but often recognizes or declares social 
change. See id. 
203. See id. at 207. 
204. See Zoglin, supra note 20, at 422. 
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damages under the Commercial Code or the Civil Code.205 Al-
though rarely used in securities regulation, one alternative has 
been the use of administrative mediation206 when informal controls 
fail to prevent serious conflict. 207 Litigation, on the other hand, has 
rarely been the source of substantive change; instead it has been 
used only when the bureaucracy has underestimated the extent of · 
discontent or the availability of litigation. 208 
v. THE NEW LEGISLATION 
A. The Regulatory Call to Arms 
In response to foreign209 and domestic210 pressure, the Japa-
nese Stock and Security Trade Review Committee recently ap-
pointed a special commission, chaired by a Tokyo University pro-
fessor, and gave it "high priority and emergency status [to] 
examine and propose reform recommendations in the matter of in-
sider trade regulation."211 The commission's recommendations in-
cluded requirements designed to promote timely disclosure, over-
haul existing barriers to insider trading and minimize market 
manipulation. 212 The commission also suggested the use of criminal 
penalties against trading company officials, stockholders, attorneys 
and others who influence investors' decisions with the help of in-
side information. 213 
The Ministry of Finance and the Diet responded by drafting 
205. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. "[U]sing various doctrinal and institu-
tional devices ... the Japanese government has attempted to prevent the development of 
litigation into an effective and ongoing vehicle for social change." F. UP~AM, supra note 84, 
at 18. 
206. See S. SETHI, supra note 116. Rule lOb-5 claims are arbitrable in most jurisdic-
tions, and are always arbitrable when they involve international contacts. Compare Sherk v. 
Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (in a lOb-5 action the Court upheld an arbitration 
clause in a contract between a German national and an American corporation) with McMa-
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 778 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986) (domestic arbitration). 
207. See F. UPHAM, supra note 84, at 18. 
208. See id. at 27. When faced with a judicial ruling, the bureaucracy will usually at-
tempt to reassert informal control. See id. It must recognize the new direction established 
by the decision, but need not include the judiciary in crafting a new administrative remedy. 
See id. 
209. See Sanger, supra note 73, at Dl, col. 1. 
210. See Rubinfien, supra note 17, at D7, col. 2. 
211. Stock and Security Trade Review Committee Report Regarding Insider Trade 
Regulation, § I(2) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) [hereinafter Stock Report] (original 
Japanese text furnished by the Japanese Ministry of Finance). 
212. See id. § II. 
213. See id. § III. 
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and approving amendments to the Securities Exchange Law.214 
The reforms included the definition and prohibition of insider 
trading,215 the creation of new reporting requirements to assist the 
Ministry in the prevention of market manipulation,216 the expan-
sion of the Ministry's power to investigate suspected violations,217 
and the imposition of criminal penalties for violations. 218 
B. Finished Product: Amended Articles 190, 190-2, and 190-3 
Amended Article 190 provides a general definition of insider 
trading not unlike that advocated by United States courts in their 
interpretation of Rule lOb-5.219 Article 190 prevents certain indi-
viduals with access to and knowledge of important information 
concerning corporate activities from trading on it unless it has 
been publicly announced.220 But unlike Rule lOb-5,221 and perhaps 
in response to pressure for an unequivocal definition of insider 
trading,222 Article 190-2 enumerates the specific circumstances and 
persons to which the Article is intended to apply.223 Access or 
knowledge will be imputed in employees, attorneys, messengers or 
business associates "who have access or obtain information 
through [their] duties or [in the course of] performing [their] 
works;"224 major stockholders who have the power to make corpo-
rate decisions, their attorneys, appointees, and trustees;225 execu-
tive officers with knowledge of important information prior to pub-
lic announcement;226 contracting agents and their attorneys, 
representatives and employees with knowledge of contracts or ne-
214. See Summary of Reformed Security Trading Procedures (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw 
trans. 1989) [hereinafter Summary] (original Japanese text furnished by the Japanese Min-
istry of Finance). 
215. See id. § 3; Securities Exchange Law arts. 190, 190-2, 190-3. (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw 
trans.). 
216. See Summary, supra note 214, § 2; Securities Exchange Law art. 188. (T. Shaw & 
Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
217. See Summary, supra note 214, § 1; Securities Exchange Law art. 154. (T. Shaw & 
Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
218. See Summary, supra note 214, § 3(1)(3); Securities Exchange Law art. 200, 205. 
(T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
219. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(3) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
220. See Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
221. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
222. See Sanger, supra note 73, at D5, col. 1. 
223. See Securities Exchange Law arts. 190-2(1-5) (persons to whom the statute ap-
plies), 190-2(2)(A) (situations in which the statute applies). 
224. See id. art. 190-2(1). 
225. See id. art. 190-2(2). 
226. See id. art. 190-2(3). 
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gotiations;227 and the .attorneys and employees of employees, com-
pany attorneys or major stockholders who have actual knowledge 
of important information by reason of their duties. 228 
The list of circumstances in which the information is not to be 
disclosed is equally strenuous. During "normal business" and un-
less "publicly announced prior to the transaction,'' information 
may not be revealed concerning possible incorporation, bank-
ruptcy, public offering, divestiture, spin-offs, dividend payments, 
consolidation, merger or acquisition, liquidation or the commer-
cialization of new products.229 In addition, information that con-
cerns disasters, changes in principal owners, and the withdrawal of 
shares from the market must be publicly announced.230 Neverthe-
less sanctions are not to be imposed against those who adhere to 
the general purpose of the law or those trading on speculation. 231 
Article 190-3 prescribes similar restrictions on the use of important 
inside information by traders, their attorneys and employees. 232 
Articles 200 and 205 impose criminal penalties for violations of 
the new insider trading laws. 233 Anyone found to have violated Ar-
ticle 190-2 is subject to no more than six months imprisonment 
and no more than a ¥- 500,000 fine. m On their face, the amended 
regulations are much more strict than Article 58. Unlike both Arti-
cle 58 and Rule lOb-5, the amended laws mark more clearly the 
definition of insider trading. While the criminal sanctions are leni-
ent by American standards, m they represent a dramatic step for a 
country where insider trading is so widely accepted. The regulation 
contains anomalies that reflect that its genuine function is not to 
curb insider trading but serve to show domestic vociferants and 
foreign trade partners that something is being done to combat in-
sider trading.236 For example the proscription of trading on inside 
227. See id. art. 190-2(4). 
228. See Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(5) (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989). 
229. See id. art. 190-2(2)(A). 
230. See id. art. 190-2(2)(8). 
231. See Summary, supra note 214, § 3(5); Securities Exchange Law art. 190-2(5)(3). 
232. See Securities E:icchange Law art. 190-3. · 
233. See id. arts. 200, 205. 
234. See id. art. 200. 
235. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Insider Trading and 
Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (102 Stat.) 4677, 4678 (maximum sentence of ten years and maximum fine of $1 mil-
lion) with Securities Exchange Law art. 200 (T. Shaw & Y. Shaw trans. 1989) (maximum 
sentence of six months and maximum fine of ¥ 500,000). Five hundred thousand yen is 
roughly equivalent to $4,000. See Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1989 at C13, col. 1. 
236. See Hurd Interview, supra note 30. 
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information in connection with mergers and acquisitions is anoma-
lous in a culture where mergers and takeovers are extremely 
rare. 287 This would seem to indicate that, like Article 58, Articles 
190-2 and 190-3 are intended more for show than for practical 
enforcement. 
Articles 190-2 and 190-3 are also handicapped by their reliance 
on a narrow definition of insider trading. The greatest strength of 
Rule lOb-5 is that it is definitive enough to provide the courts with 
a sufficient basis for judicial interpretation but flexible enough to 
apply to a variety of unanticipated situations. 288 The ambiguity of 
Rule lOb-5 forces traders to be especially careful not to violate the 
rule.289 By comparison, Japanese market regulators, faced with the 
widespread intolerance of litigation and consequential improbabil-
ity of judicial interpretation, 240 are limited to using the law to com-
municate their expectations to the market and to facilitate infor-
mal control. The SEC would be improvident to expect that the law 
will have much impact on the prosecution of insider trading in Ja-
pan. It should rely, however, on the improved compliance with the 
laws, which will certainly result from enhancements to the Minis-
try's ability to collect information concerning specific 
transactions. 241 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The failure of insider trading regulation in Japan under Arti-
cle 58 is the consequence of the American origin of the law. Be-
cause it was based largely on Securities Exchange Commission 
Rule lOb-5, Japan's Article 58 is best suited to function in a legal 
system that is more accustomed to the use of litigation as a means 
of enforcement and poorly suited to one where, to ensure bureau-
cratic autonomy in the field of securities regulation, the market is 
controlled by more informal means. Neither Rule lOb-5 nor Article 
58 could be effective without providing courts the opportunity to 
test the application of the rules; although access to Japanese courts 
is available, a significant stigma remains attached to its use. The 
law is insensitive to the dramatic differences between Japanese 
and American corporations. The sharing of information is generally 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Law arts. 188, 154. 
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more common in Japan because Japanese businesses are closely re-
lated though a complex network of interlocking directorates, large 
and permanent reciprocal shareholdings, and long term personal 
relationships. 
Japan's recent amendments to their insider trading laws are 
no more likely to be strictly enforced than the old provisions, but 
unlike Article 58, they are better suited to help the Ministry of 
Finance with the administration of informal market control. The 
elaborate definition of insider trading in the amendments, specifi-
cally Articles 190-2 and 190-3, may make formal enforcement more 
difficult, but will enhance the efficacy of informal controls by dem-
onstrating the government's determination to rectify the problem 
and constructing a more effective framework for informal dialogue 
between the Ministry of Finance and Japanese business. In addi-
tion, improvements to the investigatory powers of the Ministry of 
Finance should improve informal compliance with the laws. 
John F. Imhof, Jr. 
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